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Eliot T. Tracz

Doctrinal Evolution and the Right Against SelfIncrimination
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 109 (2019)

The Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination is one of the most wellknown constitutional protections as it is often referenced in movies, television shows, and in the
news. Despite this wide-spread awareness of the right against self-incrimination, the Federal
Circuit Courts remain split over whether the right attaches before or during trial. The specific
point of contention is when a “criminal case” commences.
This article examines the history of the right against self-incrimination beginning with its
common-law origins in Great Britain. The evolution of the right against self-incrimination is
explored up to the present-day circuit split, and the cases involved in the split are discussed in
detail. Finally, this article argues for a broad application of the right against self-incrimination.
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Eliot T. Tracz, J.D. is a Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Kathy Wallace, Minnesota 3rd
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I N T R OD U C T I ON

The Fifth Amendment is one of the most well-known constitutional
amendments. It is so well known that the phrase “plead the Fifth” has entered
common usage and can be heard regularly in conversation. This phrase is a direct
reference to the protection against self-incrimination, which reads: “[n]o person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”1 While
this clause is commonly referenced, and the text seemingly unambiguous, the legal
meaning of the clause is currently in a state of flux.
Over time, established laws change in meaning and application, even though
the text of the law itself may stay the same. These changes are inevitable as law, like
life, must evolve to fit the world in which it exists. The right against selfincrimination is quietly undergoing such a change as multiple Circuit Courts have
expanded the scope of the right beyond its traditional existence as a “trial right.”2
At the same time, other Circuit Courts have held tightly to the old application,

1

U.S. Const. amend. V.

2

See Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2017); Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698
(7th Cir. 2009); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d
161 (2d Cir. 2007); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2006).
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resulting in a circuit split.3
This article addresses the evolution of the right against self-incrimination from
its common law origins in England to the current federal circuit split. In Section I
this evolution is explored in some detail, drawing particularly upon competing
theories of the origin of the right against self-incrimination. Section I also briefly
summarizes relevant Supreme Court precedent. Section II discusses the theory of
doctrinal evolution and the ideas of two of its most important theorists. Finally,
Section III examines the circuit split and the cases taking each opposing view.
Section III concludes with an analysis of why it is best for the right against selfincrimination to continue to evolve and apply more broadly to a criminal case.
I.

T H E R I G H T A G A I N S T S E L F - I N C R I MI N A T I ON

A. The Fifth Amendment
The right against self-incrimination is well known in society, as the phrase
“plead the Fifth” is commonly used. Less well known, perhaps, is the actual text of
the self-incrimination clause: “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”4 This clause has been described as a
“landmark event in the history of Anglo-American criminal procedure.”5
Some points about the right against self-incrimination are clear. First, the
privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Constitution, applies to all
individuals.6 Second, “a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded
whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the
compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”7 One unsettled issue
is what the words “criminal case” include and when a “criminal case” begins. 8 That
is the topic of the rest of this article.
B. History
Professor John Langbein discussed two schools of thought regarding the

3

See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005); Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir.
2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003).
4

U.S. Const. amend. V.

5

John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common
Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047, 1047 (1994).
6

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).

7

Id. at 462.

8

See infra Section III.
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origins of the right against self-incrimination.9 According to Langbein, some
scholars believe that this right arose in the aftermath of the abolition of the courts
of the Star Chamber and High Commission.10 Langbein himself, on the other hand,
argues that the right against self-incrimination arose from the evolution of the
adversarial criminal procedure during the eighteenth century.11 “Thus, Langbein
credits the work of defense counsel with creating the right.”12
The first of these explanations follows a post hoc, ergo propter hoc sort of
reasoning.13 Professor Richard Hemholz has argued that the maxim nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum, loosely translated as “no one is obliged to accuse himself,” was an
established principle in English ecclesiastical courts before the earliest complaints
against the Star Chamber or the Court of High Commission.14 During the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this maxim was seized upon by Puritans
in their resistance to demands of conformity to Anglican beliefs.15 As a means of
enforcing Anglican beliefs, English rulers made use of the ecclesiastical courts and
the prerogative courts of High Commission and Star Chamber.16 One of the tools
exercised by these courts was the “ex officio” oath which required the defendant to
swear to answer any questions put to him on pain of contempt or other sanctions.17
In 1641, political and military struggles forced Charles I to summon Parliament,
who used its authority to abolish the Courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission, as well as to ban the ex officio oath.18 Eminent scholar John Wigmore
wrote that following the fall of Star Chamber and High Commission and the demise
of the ex officio oath, “a decided effect is produced, and is immediately
communicated, naturally enough, to the common law courts.”19
9

Langbein, supra note 5.

10

Id. at 1047.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/post%20hoc,%20ergo%20propter%20hoc [https://perma.cc/7VPV-X8WM] (last visited Aug. 18,
2019, 11:43 AM) (meaning “after this, therefore because of this”).

14

Richard H. Hemholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European
Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 969–89 (1990).
15

Langbein, supra note 5, at 1073.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, 16 Car. 1 c. 10 (Eng.).

19

8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 289 (John T. McNaughton ed.,
6th ed. 1961).
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The second explanation for the origin of the right against self-incrimination,
and the argument favored by Langbein, posits that the right stems from the
increased role of defense counsel in the late seventeenth century.20 During the
sixteenth century, the court was meant to serve as counsel for the accused; Sir
Edward Coke discussed this idea writing: “[T]he Court ought to be . . . of counsel for
the prisoner, to see that nothing be urged against him contrary to law and
right . . . .”21 The court would not, however, aid the defendant in matters of fact.22
This system necessarily compelled defendants to speak on their own behalf if
they wished to mount a defense.23 The assumption at the time was “if the case
against him was false the prisoner ought to say so and suggest why, and that if he
did not speak that could only be because he was unable to deny the truth of the
evidence.”24 As often happens, though, things began to change over time. Defense
counsel entered the normal criminal trial in the 1730s largely through judicial
discretion.25 This may be, as Langbein argues, due to a shift in the criminal trial
towards being a means to test the prosecution’s case against the defendant.26
Langbein argues that there are several reasons for this shift. First, the concept
of “cases” replaced the “altercation” method in which the defendant rebutted each
piece of evidence as received.27 Second, the presumption of innocence was
introduced.28 Third, rules of evidence were formulated.29 Fourth, the effectiveness
of defense counsel increased the use of prosecuting counsel.30 Fifth, the role of the
judge changed as counsel took over for the defense and the prosecution.31 Finally,
the relationship between the court and the jury changed.32

20

Langbein, supra note 5, at 1066–67.

21

Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England:
Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Clauses 29
(1644).
22

Langbein, supra note 5, at 1051.

23

Id. at 1049–66.

24

J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800, 348–49 (1986).

25

John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 311–13 (1978).

26

Langbein, supra note 5, at 1068–71.

27

Id. at 1069–70.

28

Id. at 1070.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 1070–71.

32

Id. at 1071.
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Interesting as these two origin theories are, the truth is that we may never know
how the right against self-incrimination arose. Practically speaking however, the
historical origins of the right against self-incrimination become relevant as recent
Supreme Court appointees move the court farther towards embracing
Originalism.33 With a split between circuits increasing the likelihood of Supreme
Court review, the historical origins of the right against self-incrimination may
become a factor in the outcome.
C. The Supreme Court
When does a “criminal case” commence as it relates to the right against selfincrimination? The answer is unclear. The United States Supreme Court case law
is largely unsettled. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court said “[t]he
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants.”34 Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may
ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.35
The most recent case to consider the right against self-incrimination, Chavez v.
Martinez, acknowledged that “[s]tatements compelled by police interrogations
cannot be used against a defendant at trial.”36 The Chavez Court declined to rule on
when a criminal case begins.37 At the same time, the Court stated that a “criminal
case” requires, at the very least, the initiation of legal proceedings.38 The plaintiff in
Chavez was never charged with a crime; therefore, his statements were never used
against him in any criminal proceedings.39
Verdugo-Urquidez seems to be clearly of the opinion that the right against selfincrimination only applies at trial. Chavez, on the other hand, seems to read the
right as applying to “criminal cases” though not necessarily limiting its application
strictly to trial. Finally, there is Miranda, which requires that a person be informed
of his or her right to remain silent (that is, his or her right against self33

Steven B. Katz, The Supreme Court Embraces Statutory Originalism, American Bar Association
(May 29, 2019) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/employment-laborrelations/articles/2019/spring2019-supreme-court-embraces-statutory-originalism/
[https://perma.cc/WL66-9ZF9] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
34

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).

35

Id.; See also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (Fifth Amendment described as a
“trial right.”).
36

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003).

37

Id.

38

Id. at 766.

39

Id. at 765.
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incrimination) at the time of arrest, which may be well before trial.40
The various Circuit Courts are equally inconsistent in their holdings, vacillating
between the right only applying at trial, and the right being applicable to pre-trial
proceedings.41 As recently as 2017, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals wrestled with
this issue but merely added to the already existing circuit split.42 Because of the
number of circuits that have weighed in on the issue of when a “criminal case”
begins, the issue is certainly ripe for Supreme Court review. For purposes of this
article, each decision reached by the different circuits merits discussion.
II. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

Evolution is a word that is often used in everyday speech to convey the idea of
change or, more precisely, of nonrandom change.43 It is often described in a
Darwinian model, yet ideas of the law as a living thing predate Darwin by hundreds
of years.44 The British jurist Sir Edward Coke touched on the issue in his famous
Institutes, writing, “[n]ow as of the old fields must come the new corne, so our old
books do excellently expound, and expresse this matter as the Law is holden at this
day.”45
A. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Any discussion of doctrinal evolution should probably begin with Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. and the ideas first presented in his monumental work, The
Common Law.46 The Common Law began as a series of lectures delivered in 1880 at the
Lowell Institute in Boston, Massachusetts. In these lectures, Holmes introduced
and explored the idea that old doctrines do not die out; they simply evolve to fit new
policy doctrines.47 Throughout his career, he elaborated on this idea and developed
it into a more refined theory:
Every one instinctively recognizes that in these days the justification of a law for us

40

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).

41

See infra Section III.

42

See infra Section III.

43

Owen D. Jones & Timothy H Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 405,
479 (2005).
44

See id.

45

2 Sir Edward Coke, The Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke 801 (Steve Sheppard
ed., 2005).
46

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Paula J.S. Pereira et al. eds., 1880).

47

See generally id.
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cannot be found in the fact that our fathers have followed it. It must be found in some
help which the law brings toward reaching a social end which the governing power of
the community has made up its mind that it wants. And when a lawyer sees a rule of
law in force he is very apt to invent, if he does not find, some ground of policy for its
base. But in fact some rules are mere survivals.48

Such theories, however, do not simply spring anew, and Holmes drew influence
from several contemporary movements of equal stature.
It is unsurprising that The Common Law is sprinkled with allusions to the
theories of evolution that were in vogue at the time the lectures were written.
Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859,49 and though there is no
evidence that Holmes ever read it, the influence of Darwin’s ideas were alive and
thriving in the learned communities.50
Another equally powerful influence on Holmes was his relationship with the
founders of pragmatist philosophy: Charles Sanders Pierce and William James.51
The three were members of a group called the Metaphysical Club whose members
worked “to come to terms with the new science, which had put all in doubt.”52
Rejecting a purely logical view of the law, Holmes’ pragmatic influences are clearly
demonstrated in what may be The Common Law’s most famous passage:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.53

Given such influences, it is not surprising that Holmes developed a theory that legal
doctrines, and therefore the law itself, are subject to evolution.
The most well-known illustration of Holmes’s theory traces the origin of owner
liability in tort law back as far as the Book of Exodus.54 Holmes cites an oft-quoted
passage from Mosaic law: “[i]f an Ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: than the
ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox

48

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 452 (1899).

49

Charles Darwin, On The Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Down, Bromley, Kent eds., 1859).
50

Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 343, 364 (1984).

51

Id. at 362.

52

Id.

53

Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 46, at 5.

54

Id.
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shall be quit.”55 Similarly, Holmes finds equivalents in the Roman laws of the noxæ
deditio56 as well as the laws of the Salic Franks in Germany.57 Roman and Salic
influences, Holmes found, could be identified in the laws of the United Kingdom as
far back as 680 AD, thus providing a direct link between the ancient laws and the
modern laws.58 By this time, the owner of a violent animal, employer of a reckless
employee, or other such person held responsible for the injury caused on his watch,
could simply pay a fee to relieve the liability.59 One hundred-thirty years after
Holmes delivered The Common Law lectures, it is easy to identify in the early English
laws the predecessor to the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Holmes’ dedication to his theory that doctrines evolve even after the basis for
their origins have disappeared did not end with The Common Law. In his later works,
he revisited and refined his theory.60 Applying his theory, he demonstrated how a
mysterious figure from Salic Law known as the Salmannus, who figured
prominently in rituals surrounding transfers of real property, grew to be what we
now know as the executor of an estate.61 Equally as interesting to Holmes was how
the ancient political practice of demanding hostages as surety for the behavior of a
defeated foe served as a forerunner for the modern secured transaction.62 For each
of these examples it was evident that “just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the
existence of some earlier creature to which a collar bone was useful, precedents
survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for
them has been forgotten.”63 It seemed to Holmes that in the law, as in nature,
evolution was at work.
Each of the examples Holmes gave shows a case in which a precedent
successfully evolved from its original purpose to meet some new need. From these
examples, it would be easy to assume that old doctrines that continue to be applied
are selected for their soundness in their new application. Holmes warns against
such an assumption, however, counselling that “if old implements could not be

55

Id. at 10.

56

Id. at 11.

57

Id. at 19.

58

Id. at 20.

59

Id. at 17.

60

See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 452; Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457 (1897).

61

Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 444–46.

62

Id. at 448.

63

Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 46, at 35.
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adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow. But scrutiny and revision are
justified.”64 For Holmes, history and experience were acceptable sources for
modern doctrines, with the strongest precedents surviving to meet new challenges
as their old uses died out. It was, however, the duty of lawyers and judges to
continue to examine the precedents to ensure that they remained valid. “History
sets us free,” Holmes wrote in 1899, “and enables us to make up our minds
dispassionately whether the survival which we are enforcing answers any new
purpose when it has ceased to answer the old.”65
B. Robert C. Clark
Following Holmes’s work, references to “evolution” were uncommon between
the mid 1920s and the late 1970s.66 Then, in 1977, Harvard Law Professor Robert C.
Clark stepped beyond Holmes’ application of evolutionary theory to the common
law and applied it to statutory law.67 Professor Clark was a major proponent of a
type of scholarship that he referred to as the Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution (ISLE).68
Professor Clark’s first examination of the evolution of statutes came in his 1977
examination of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code.69 Professor Clark
identified a number of fundamental structural decisions that make up the
foundation of the framework in which taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts interact.
He theorized that within that framework, lawyers and taxpayers were constantly
attempting to discover new ways of reducing their taxes.70 Professor E. Donald
Elliott, a Yale Law Professor and law evolution scholar, noted that while Professor
Clark described a valid model of change, and despite his use of evolutionary
language, it is unclear at this point of Clark’s career in what sense he means that
these changes are evolutionary.71
In a 1981 paper, Professor Clark developed his most coherent theory of statutory

64

Id. at 37.

65

Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, supra note 48, at 452.

66

E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38, 59 (1985).

67

See Robert Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform,
87 Yale L.J. 90, 90 (1977).
68

Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238, 1238 (1981).

69

Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C, supra note 67, at 90.

70

Id. at 95.

71

Elliott, supra note 66, at 60.
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evolution.72 He identified two general patterns of change that explained the
development of laws.73 First, Professor Clark described a four part pattern of
development.74 In the first part, external changes—whether technological, social,
or otherwise—create new opportunities for legal rules to reduce certain costs.75 The
second part featured a responsive legal invention, in which a new legal principle or
institution is created which reduces costs better than previously identified
alternatives.76 In the third part, the success of the new legal principle creates new
needs and opportunities for reducing costs.77 Finally, in the fourth part, substantial
legal activity occurs, which results in the creation of statutes, regulations, and case
law aimed at exploiting those opportunities.78
The cost reduction that Professor Clark identified as a goal of legal change falls
into two different classes: primary and secondary.79 While primary cost reduction
is the result of elementary principles of institutional design, secondary cost
reduction is only achieved by “lengthy, complex efflorescence of doctrinal detail.” 80
In Clark’s estimation, the associated legal developments are more capable of being
studied without appealing to changes in exogenous factors.81
The second pattern identified by Professor Clark involves “the connection
between changes in the size of economic units or transactions and the subsequent
development of new institutions and rules.”82 This pattern of development is, in
Professor Clark’s opinion, particularly applicable to corporate and securities law.83
Professor Clark attributes the rise of the corporate organizational form to its
competitive success over alternative forms of organization.84 Professor Clark’s
theories tend to show those patterns of cost reduction are the underlying force

72

See Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, supra note 68, at 1238.

73

Id. at 1241.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 1241–42.

81

Id. at 1242.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 1242–47.

84

Id. at 1243 (noting the corporate form of organization includes such characteristics as limited
liability, free transferability of shares, strong legal personality, and centralized management).
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driving the evolution of legal rules,85 therefore supporting the economic argument
for why constitutions change over time.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT

Recent case law supports the existence of an evolving application of the right
against self-incrimination. On the one hand, a small group of appellate courts
interpret Chavez as limiting the right strictly to trial and not to pre-trial
proceedings. A number of other appellate courts have found that the right against
self-incrimination extends beyond trial and encompasses pre-trial proceedings.
A. Limited to Trial
1.

Third Circuit

In the case of Renda v. King, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
whether a person’s Miranda rights have been violated if that person’s statements are
not used against her at trial.86 Valerie Renda was involved in a domestic dispute
with her boyfriend, Joe Sonafelt, a Pennsylvania State Trooper.87 On May 15, 1995,
Ms. Renda left Sonafelt, taking their two-year old son with her to a friend’s
apartment.88 Sonafelt reported this to the local police, claiming that Renda violated
a custody order by abducting their son.89 Local authorities referred the case to the
Pennsylvania State Police.90 There, Corporal Kelsey of the State Police determined
that Sonafelt’s complaint, in addition to a complaint that Sonafelt kicked Renda in
the back the previous day, would be handled by State Police Trooper Paul King.91
On May 15, 1995, Trooper King contacted Renda by phone.92 During the call,
Renda told Trooper King that Sonafelt slammed her into a wall earlier that day;
however, she also indicated that she did not want to file charges or give a
statement.93 Based on these allegations, Trooper King conducted a tape recorded

85

Elliott, supra note 66, at 62.

86

See Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003).

87

Id. at 550.

88

Id. at 552.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.
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interview of Trooper Sonafelt, whom he provided with a Miranda warning.94 The
next morning, at about 2:30 a.m., Corporal Kelsey and Trooper King interviewed
Renda in person, at her friend’s apartment.95 She was not given a Miranda warning;
however, she provided a written statement that did not mention the May 15
assault.96
At trial, Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey testified that when they asked Renda
why she had not included the assault in her statement, Renda stated that she had
lied about the assault during her phone interview with Trooper King.97 However,
Renda contradicted this in her own trial testimony, by stating that she never told
Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey that she lied, and that the reason she had not
included the statement about the assault was because she did not want to file a
complaint against Sonafelt.98 She also testified that she only made the statement
after Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey threatened her.99
On June 7, 1995, Trooper King charged Renda with giving false reports to law
enforcement and obtained an arrest warrant for Renda.100 The statements she
made to law enforcement were suppressed because she had not received a Miranda
warning and the case was nolle prossed by the District Attorney’s office.101
Subsequently, Renda filed suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that
Trooper King and Corporal Kelsey violated her First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by subjecting her to a coercive interrogation.102 Renda also
claimed that she was interrogated without Miranda warnings, subject to unlawful
search, arrest, and imprisonment, and maliciously prosecuted.103 The District
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment,
false arrest, false imprisonment, and Miranda claims, but a jury found in favor of
Renda on the malicious prosecution claim.104 Renda moved for relief from

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 552–53.

100

Id. at 553.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.
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judgment relating to the Miranda claim but her motion was denied.105 Trooper King
appealed the verdict and Renda filed a cross-appeal.106
In determining that Renda’s right against self-incrimination had not been
violated, the Third Circuit relied heavily on its prior ruling in Giuffre v. Bissell107 as
well as on Chavez.108 Giuffre, holding that a plaintiff may not base a §1983 claim on
the fact that police failed to provide a Miranda warning, served as the basis on which
the District Court granted summary judgment for Renda’s Miranda claim.109 Chavez,
the court argued, affirmed that Giuffre was good law.110
Going further, the court found that Chavez was similar to Renda’s case in that
both cases involved a situation where police questioned a suspect without providing
a Miranda warning.111 The difference between the two cases was that in Chavez, the
defendant was never charged with a crime so his statements were never used in a
criminal proceeding.112 Because Chavez did not address the moment that a criminal
case commences, the court argued that Giuffre “compels the conclusion that it is the
use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an
indictment, that violates the Constitution.”113
2. Fourth Circuit
In Burrell v. Virginia, The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination only applied at
trial.114 Charles Burrell was involved in an auto accident on February 19, 2002.115
After the accident, Officer Chris Johnson requested that Burrell produce proof of
insurance for his vehicle.116 Instead of producing his proof of insurance, Burrell
refused to answer Officer Johnson and expressed his Fifth Amendment right

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 557–58.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 557–59; See Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241 (3rd Cir. 1994).

110

Renda, 347 F.3d at 557–58.

111

Id. at 558.

112

Id. at 558–59.

113

Id. at 559.

114

See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2005).

115

Id. at 510.

116

Id.

122

DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

against self-incrimination.117 In response, the officer warned Burrell that if he
continued to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, Burrell would be arrested for
obstruction of justice.118 Sergeant John Hall, Officer Johnson’s supervisor, arrived
on the scene and repeated the warning but to no avail.119
During Burrell’s transport to the hospital for treatment of injuries he sustained
during the accident, Officer Johnson served him with a Confirmation of Liability
form.120 The form required that Burrell provide liability insurance information to
the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles within thirty days.121 Officer Johnson
also served Burrell with two summonses: one for lack of insurance and another for
obstruction of justice.122 Burrell was convicted of obstruction of justice, but the
failure to pay the uninsured motorist fee was dismissed.123 A Virginia appellate
court later dismissed the obstruction conviction.124
Burrell filed a §1983 suit in federal court, alleging that the defendants violated
his Fifth Amendment rights by compelling him to produce evidence of insurance
and by issuing a citation without probable cause.125 In his complaint, Burrell also
claimed criminal violations of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, as
well as a civil allegation for liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.126 The District Court dismissed all of those claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.127 Burrell appealed the dismissals.128
The Court of Appeals found that Chavez barred a §1983 suit under the
circumstances of Burrell’s case, regardless of whether the Fifth Amendment
precluded the admission of insurance information produced under compulsion.129
This was so because Chavez refused to allow a §1983 suit to proceed since no
compelled testimony was ever admitted in court and, therefore, there was no
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constitutional violation.130 The Court of Appeals found that Burrell did not allege
any trial action that violated his Fifth Amendment rights, and thus failed to state a
claim.131
3.

Fifth Circuit

In the 1996 case of Murray v. Earle, LaCresha Murray was eleven years old when
she was involved in the death of two-year-old Jayla Belton.132 At that time, LaCresha
lived with her grandparents (who were also her adoptive parents), R.L. and Shirley
Murray.133 The Murrays provided daycare in their home for Jayla Belton, as well as
for several other children.134
In May of 1996, Belton was dropped off at the Murray home for daycare.135 As
the day progressed, Belton began to show signs of illness.136 After realizing that
Belton had vomited at the lunch table, LaCresha’s older sister, Shawntay, gave
Belton some medicine and put her to bed.137 No one looked in on Belton until late
that afternoon.138 At trial, R.L. Murray testified that at some point during the
afternoon, he noticed that LeCresha had gone to the back of the house, near the
bedroom where Belton was sleeping.139 He claimed that he heard “thumping noises”
but, assuming that LaCresha was just playing with a ball, he told her to stop.140 Soon
after, LaCresha told R.L. that Belton was “throwing up and shaking.”141 Around 5:00
p.m., a parent showed up to retrieve her children and noticed Belton’s condition.142
The parent urged R.L. to call 911; however, he declined.143 Instead, R.L. took Belton
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to the hospital himself.144 Belton was pronounced dead at approximately 5:30 p.m.145
An autopsy revealed horrifying injuries. There were over thirty bruises to
Belton’s head, ear, forehead, back, shoulder, elbow, chest, and the left side of her
torso.146 Even worse, Belton received a blow to the abdomen that broke four of her
ribs and split her liver into two pieces.147 The medical examiner determined that
Belton died within five to fifteen minutes of her injuries and ruled her death a
homicide.148
It is unclear when LaCresha first became a suspect, but three days after the
autopsy, Detective Hector Reveles directed Detectives Ernest Pedraza and Albert
Eells, as well as Angela McGown of Travis County Child Protective Services, to
interview LaCresha.149 After Detectives Reveles and Pedraza conferred with an
assistant district attorney, they determined that LaCresha was not in the custody of
the state, and that the interview did not need to occur in front of a magistrate.150
LaCresha was given a Miranda warning, but her parents were not notified of the
interview nor was an attorney.151
After about two hours of questioning, LaCresha confessed that she had dropped
Belton and kicked her.152 LaCresha was subsequently charged with capital murder
and injury to a child, then convicted of negligent homicide and injury to a child after
her statement was admitted by the juvenile court.153 After widespread publicity, a
new trial was ordered.154 During that proceeding, in which LaCresha was charged
with injury to a child, her statement of confession was again admitted, and
LaCresha was again convicted.155 As a result, LaCresha was adjudicated as a
delinquent and sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Texas Youth
Commission.156 Three years later, a Texas appellate court reversed LaCresha’s
144
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conviction, finding that her confession was inadmissible.157 LaCresha subsequently
brought a §1983 suit in the District Court for the Western District of Texas, which
dismissed all of her claims, except her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and her state law civil conspiracy claims.158 The defendants appealed
the denial of their summary judgment motions on those counts.159
Early in its opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that “[t]he
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right
which can be violated only at trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law
enforcement officials may ultimately impair that right.”160 The Court of Appeals
offered no analysis of this statement or support for the tenant of law other than a
footnote citation to Chavez and another case.161 The Court of Appeals ultimately
determined that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate.162
B. Extending Beyond Trial
1.

Second Circuit

Abdallah Higazy’s story began on September 11, 2001.163 Higazy was an
Egyptian student, studying computer engineering at Polytechnic University in
Brooklyn, New York with sponsorship from the United States Agency for
International Development and the Institute for International Education.164 His
sponsors arranged for him to stay at the Millenium Hotel, which was located across
the street from the World Trade Center.165
Higazy awoke about forty-five minutes before the first hijacked plane crashed
into the World Trade Center.166 Shortly after the second plane crashed, Higazy and
the other hotel guests were evacuated from the hotel, leaving Higazy with only one
hundred dollars in cash, his wallet, and the clothes he was wearing.167 In late
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September or early October, hotel employees, including Millenium’s chief security
officer, Stuart Yule, and another security employee, Ronald Ferry, began retrieving
and inventorying guest property that remained after the evacuation.168 Ferry
informed Yule that he found a radio, a passport, a yellow medallion, and a Koran in
room 5101.169 In November, a different hotel employee brought the radio to Yule’s
attention; this time, Yule called the FBI to tell them that he had “something of
interest they should see.”170 Agents Vincent Sullivan and Christopher Bruno
examined the radio and determined that it was “an air-band transceiver capable of
air-to-air and air-to-ground communication.”171
On December 17, 2001, Higazy went to the Millenium to retrieve his
belongings.172 He arrived in the morning because he had an exam scheduled for that
afternoon.173 While at the hotel, Higazy was approached by Agents Sullivan and
Bruno, as well as a third FBI agent, Adam Suits.174 The agents asked Higazy about
the radio and Higazy denied the radio was his.175 Even after being told that the radio
was found in his room’s safe, Higazy continued to express his denial, replying:
“[T]hat’s impossible.”176 During this conversation, Higazy told the agents that he
had never seen such a radio before; however, he later told the agents that “he was
once a lieutenant in the Egyptian Air Force and had knowledge of radio
communications.”177 At the end of the interview, Higazy was detained as a material
witness and taken to the FBI building.178
Higazy voluntarily waived his right to counsel but then changed his mind and
asked for an attorney.179 At that point the interrogation stopped and Higazy spent
the night of December 17, 2011 in detention.180 In light of contradictions between
Higazy’s statements and those of Millenium Hotel employees, Agent Bruno swore
168
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out an affidavit concluding that “Higazy might have given false statements to
federal law enforcement agents.”181 The affidavit was dated December 18, 2001.182
Higazy was taken later that day before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on a material witness warrant.183 Counsel for Higazy
told the court that his client denied owning the radio and was “urgently desirous of
taking a lie detector test.”184
Over the doubts of the government, Higazy was administered a polygraph test
by Agent Templeton on December 27, 2001.185 The first round of questions
“[allegedly] suggested that Higazy’s answers to questions related to the September
11 attacks were deceptive.”186 During the second round of questions, Higazy
reported intense pain in his arm and asked Templeton to stop.187 Templeton
reportedly called Higazy a baby; when asked if other people ever suffered physical
pain during a polygraph, Templeton responded that “[i]t never happened to anyone
who told the truth.”188
During the polygraph, Higazy gave a series of explanations regarding how he
had obtained the radio.189 His first explanation was that he stole the radio from an
electronics store.190 Higazy then stated that he found it near the electronics store.191
Next, he claimed he never saw nor possessed the radio.192 Later on in the test,
Higazy admitted finding the radio on the other side of the Brooklyn Bridge.193
Finally, he admitted stealing the radio from the Egyptian military.194 Throughout
the course of this interrogation, Templeton yelled at Higazy for lying and said he
would “tell Agent Sullivan in my expert opinion you are a terrorist.”195 Templeton
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wrote a statement saying that Higazy stole the radio from the Egyptian military, but
Higazy’s attorney advised him not to sign it.196 Subsequently, on January 11, 2002,
Agent Bruno charged Higazy with making false statements.197 The magistrate judge
ordered Higazy held without bail.198
Three days later, an airline pilot who had been a guest on the 50th floor of the
Millenium Hotel, one floor below where Higazy stayed, returned to the property to
reclaim his belongings.199 After looking through his items, the pilot informed hotel
staff that his transceiver was missing.200 When contacted by the hotel, the FBI
verified that the transceiver believed to be Higazy’s actually belonged to the pilot.201
Ferry was re-interviewed by the FBI and changed his account to say that the radio
was found on a table in Higazy’s room and not in a safe.202 As a result, the
government withdrew the complaint against Higazy.203 Higazy subsequently filed
an eight-count complaint against Templeton and the hotel, which included a claim
that Higazy’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated.204
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision in this case on a
different reading of Chavez than the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits.205 The court
cited Justice Thomas’s conclusion that “a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the
initiation of legal proceedings.”206 Building on this, as well as citing to additional
cases, the Court of Appeals determined that bail hearings constitute part of the
criminal proceeding.207
After concluding that a bail hearing was part of the criminal case against
Higazy, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the use of Higazy’s statements
violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced statements.208 Relying on
prior Second Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals found that “the use or the
196
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derivative use of a compelled statement at any criminal proceeding against the
declarant violates the person’s Fifth Amendment rights; use of the statement at trial
is not required.”209 The court further argued that there is no indication in Chavez
that the use of an allegedly coerced statement at an initial appearance cannot be
used in a criminal case.210 Ultimately, the court found that the use of Higazy’s
statements at the bail hearing did violate his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.211
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has visited this issue on two separate
occasions, first, in Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois,212 and again in Best v. City of
Portland.213 In each case the Court of Appeals determined that a “criminal case”
extended beyond just a trial.214 These cases are discussed in detail below.
a. Sornberger
On January 12, 2001, First Bank in Knoxville, Illinois was robbed by a man
wearing a baseball cap.215 Only the teller caught a glimpse of the robber’s face, and
she gave the police a general, physical description.216 Later, when several of the
bank’s employees were reviewing footage of the robbery, one of the employees
remarked that the robber “looked like” Scott Sornberger.217 The other employees
agreed, and Knoxville Chief of Police Rick Pesci heard at least one of the employees
comment about the resemblance to Sornberger.218
Based on this information, Chief Pesci questioned several bank employees and
learned that Sornberger and his wife were previous customers at First Bank but that
their account was closed because of a low account balance.219 Police were sent to
Sornberger’s place of employment to bring him to the police station.220 Although
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police found that Sornberger did not meet the physical description given by the
teller, they questioned Sornberger and learned that he experienced recent financial
difficulties.221
That same evening, Knoxville police questioned Sornberger’s wife, Teresa, at
the police station.222 Despite being separated during questioning, the Sornbergers
offered consistent alibis.223 Both stated that they were at Sornberger’s parents’
home using his parents’ computer at the time of the incident.224
Chief Pesci brought in several police officers from Galesburg to assist in the
investigation, and on the day following the robbery, one of the officers, Officer
Clauge, brought photographs from the surveillance cameras as well as pictures of
Sornberger to show to the State’s Attorney.225 The State’s Attorney declined to seek
an arrest warrant for Sornberger, but did obtain a search warrant for the computer
to confirm Sornberger’s alibi.226 After a further meeting with Chief Pesci and
Officer Clauge, the State’s Attorney determined that there was probable cause to
arrest Sornberger for armed robbery.227 The officers agreed to arrest Sornberger
“during the execution of the search warrant . . . and . . . re-interview Teresa if she
could be found at [Scott Sornberger’s] parents’ home.”228
The day after the robbery the officers arrived at Sornberger’s parents’ house;
only Teresa was home.229 She accompanied officers to the Galesburg police station
(it is disputed whether this was done voluntarily or under duress) but was allowed
to ride in the front seat and was not restrained.230 Officers Sheppard and Riley
interviewed Teresa, resulting in a verbal, and later a written, confession in which
she admitted that she assisted Sornberger in robbing First Bank.231
Upon arriving in Galesburg, Teresa was informed that she was a suspect in the
robbery.232
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Teresa claim[ed] that she was then . . . coerced into confessing by Officer Sheppard who
allegedly (1) falsely told her that witnesses placed her at the scene of the robbery; (2)
“repeatedly told her to think about her kids”; (3) “yelled at her and accused her of lying”;
(4) falsely promised her that, if she implicated her husband, she would not be charged
with any crime; (5) “threatened to call the Department of Children and Family
Services” . . . to take her children away if she maintained her innocence; and (6) “refused
to honor her request to speak to an attorney.”233

Finally, she claimed that she never received a Miranda warning “until asked to repeat
her oral confession to the Galesburg police stenographer.”234
The defendants claimed that Teresa needed little prodding before she
voluntarily confessed.235 The officers said that they informed her that they believed
Sornberger robbed the bank, asked Teresa about a witness who saw her leave the
bank that same day, and encouraged her to think about her children instead of
protecting Sornberger.236 The defendants further maintained that Officer
Sheppard advised Teresa of her Miranda rights.237
After Teresa confessed, Chief Pesci was brought into the room and Teresa was
asked to repeat her confession.238 She refused, and this time the officers admitted
that they made threats.239 Eventually, Teresa was presented with a transcribed
version of her confession and signed it.240
Criminal proceedings were brought against Sornberger and Teresa, with
Teresa’s statement offered into evidence in support of the charges.241 A pre-trial
motion to suppress the confession was denied, with the court finding no violation
of the right against self-incrimination.242 While the Sornbergers were in custody
awaiting trial, a man named Phillip Pitcher (who resembled Sornberger) committed
a number of bank robberies in Indiana and Illinois.243 Further investigation by the
FBI resulted in the charges against Sornberger and Teresa being dropped.244
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Sornberger and Teresa filed a §1983 suit against the City of Knoxville and the
involved officers, alleging in part that Teresa’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination was violated.245
The Seventh Circuit engaged in a lengthy examination of Chavez before
addressing the two cases it considered to be the most similar: Renda and Burrell.246
The court noted that Renda left open the question of “when a statement is used in a
criminal proceeding.”247 Next, the court noted that unlike in Burrell, Teresa’s
statements were used against her to support a determination of probable cause, to
set proper bail, and at arraignment.248 Therefore, the three “courtroom uses” of
Teresa’s unwarned statements did violate her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.249
b.

Best

In 2009, the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue of what constitutes a criminal
case in Best v. City of Portland.250 In this case, Larry Best was charged in an Indiana
state court with two drug crimes: possession of methamphetamine and possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine.251 The evidence against Best was
obtained through searches of two homes: one with a warrant and one with the
owner’s consent.252 Best unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.253 In an interlocutory
appeal, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.254 Best then deposed the officer who
led the searches and, based on new information obtained in the deposition, filed a
motion to reconsider the original motion to suppress.255 The prosecutor, however,
dropped the charges against Best before the trial court could issue a ruling.256
Before the charges were dropped, Best filed a §1983 suit naming the City of

245

Id. at 1009–10.

246

Id. at 1023–26.

247

Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1026 (citing Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2003)).

248

Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1027.

249

Id.

250

Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2009).

251

Id.

252

Id.

253

Id.

254

Id.

255

Id.

256

Id.

133

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

18:1 (2019)

Portland and four police officers as defendants.257 Among the claims included in
the complaint was a claim that Best’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination had been violated.258 The District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding in part that
“Best’s right against self-incrimination could not have been violated because the
case was dismissed before it went to trial.”259
In addressing whether Best’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination were violated, the Court of Appeals relied on its prior ruling in
Sornberg.260 Specifically, the court found that the use of Best’s allegations that his
statements had been used at a suppression hearing were sufficient to allow a §1983
case to proceed because the suppression hearing was part of a criminal case.261 The
court remanded the case without reaching the merits of Best’s claim.262
3.

Ninth Circuit

In Stoot v. City of Everett, Paul Stoot II was accused of sexually assaulting a four
year old girl.263 On January 15, 2003, the investigating officer, Detective Jon Jensen,
called the middle school where Stoot was a student to arrange an on-campus
interview in the principal’s office.264 Before conducting the interview, Jensen met
with two prosecutors in order to review the legal standards for interviewing a
juvenile.265 Based on these discussions, Jensen noted that he learned two pieces of
information: “(1) if the juvenile requests his parents during the interview, treat the
request the same as one for legal counsel, and (2) give the juvenile a Miranda
warning and have him sign the waiver form” even if the interview is noncustodial.266 After this meeting, Jensen informed the middle school principal that
she did not need to contact Stoot’s parents; rather, he would do so after the
interview.267

257

Id. at 700.

258

Id. at 702–03.

259

Id. at 700.

260

Id. at 702–03.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 703.

263

Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2009).

264

Id. at 914.

265

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id.

134

DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Jensen testified that during the interview, he explained Stoot’s rights, Stoot
understood those rights, and Stoot waived those rights.268 In his testimony, Jensen
claimed that he employed “the interviewing technique of blaming the victim.”269
Ultimately, Stoot confessed to touching the victim.270
Stoot and his parents contended that after Stoot repeatedly denied touching the
victim, Jensen changed his tactics and began making impermissible threats.271 After
two hours of questioning, Stoot claimed he made a false confession.272 Additionally,
Stoot and his parents alleged that Jensen’s interviewing tactics violated Miranda
because Stoot lacked capacity to consent to the interrogation.273
After the interview, a prosecutor filed an Information charging Stoot with first
degree child molestation.274 The Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the
Information relied only on the statements of the complaining witness, the interview
with the victim, and Stoot’s confession.275 On November 3, 2004, a hearing was held
to determine the admissibility of Stoot’s statement.276 After hearing from Jensen,
Stoot, and experts, the court determined that Stoot lacked capacity to understand
his rights, and the waiver of his rights was invalid.277 The court also determined that
the statements made by Stoot were the result of “impermissible coercion.”278
Finally, the court dismissed the charges against Stoot.279
Stoot and his parents filed a §1983 suit against Jensen and the City of Everett.280
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims,
including finding that Stoot did not demonstrate a claim that his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was violated because the statements against him
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were never used in a criminal trial.281 Stoot appealed to the Ninth Circuit.282
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals argued that Stoot’s Fifth Amendment claim
fell “squarely within the gray area created by Chavez.”283 Unlike the plaintiff in
Chavez, who was never charged with a crime, Stoot’s statements were used against
him in the Affidavit accompanying the Information which charged him with a
crime, in a pretrial arraignment, and again in an evidentiary hearing.284 The Court
of Appeals considered prior case law from other circuits before adopting the
approach of Sornberger and Higazy.285 The court found that the use of coerced
statements at trial was not required for Stoot to assert a claim that his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination had been violated.286
4.

Tenth Circuit

Matthew Vogt was a police officer in the City of Hays, Kansas.287 In 2013, Mr.
Vogt applied for employment with the Haysville Police Department.288 During the
hiring process, Mr. Vogt revealed that he still maintained a knife that he obtained
during the course of his employment as a police officer in Hays.289 Despite this
revelation, the Haysville Police Department offered Mr. Vogt a position based on
the condition that he report his acquisition of the knife and return it to the Hays
Police Department.290
Mr. Vogt complied with the condition and reported to the Hays Police
Department that he had kept the knife.291 The Chief of the Hays Police Department
ordered Vogt to submit a report concerning his possession of the knife and Vogt
complied by submitting a one-sentence report.292 Vogt subsequently provided the
Hays Police Department with his two-week notice.293
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Concurrently, the Hays police chief initiated an internal investigation into
Vogt’s possession of the knife.294 In order to keep his job with Hays Police, the
department required that Vogt give a more detailed statement regarding the
knife.295 Vogt complied, and the additional statement was used to find more
evidence.296 The Hays police chief ultimately asked the Kansas Bureau of
Investigation to open a criminal investigation, and in support of this request,
turned over Mr. Vogt’s statements and the additional evidence.297 Because of the
pending investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdrew its job offer to
Vogt.298
Vogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession
of the knife.299 After a probable cause hearing, the state district court found that
there was no probable cause and the charges against Vogt were dismissed.300 Vogt
then filed suit in the District Court of Kansas alleging that his statements were used:
“(1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence
concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal
charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing.”301
The District Court dismissed Vogt’s complaint for failure to state a claim, holding
that the right against self-incrimination is only a trial right and that Vogt’s
statements were used in pretrial proceedings, not in a trial.302
The Court of Appeals’ opinion turned on the meaning of “criminal case” under
the Fifth Amendment.303 While the District Court found that the use of Vogt’s
statements did not violate the Fifth Amendment because they were not used at trial,
the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the phrase “criminal case” also includes
probable cause hearings.304 The court’s stated basis for reaching this conclusion
included reliance on the text of the Fifth Amendment and the Framers’
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understanding of the right against self-incrimination.305
The court first addressed the text of the Fifth Amendment, drawing attention
to the fact that the text does not include the term “trial” or “criminal prosecution.”306
Far from being a lawyers’ quibble about semantics, the text of the Fifth Amendment
is important for its differences from other Amendments.307 The Court of Appeals
discussed the Supreme Court’s distinction between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments in Counselman v. Hitchcock.308 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that a witness could plead the Fifth Amendment during a grand jury proceeding
because the Fifth Amendment’s “criminal case” language is broader than the Sixth
Amendment’s “criminal prosecution.”309 The Court of Appeals agreed with the
Counselman opinion, arguing that the term “criminal case” on its face encompasses
all of the proceedings involved in a “criminal prosecution”310
The Court of Appeals then moved on to analyze the meaning of “criminal case”
at the time of ratification in 1791, by reviewing dictionary definitions from the
Founding era.311 The Court of Appeals first addressed the 1828 dictionary published
by Noah Webster.312 This dictionary defined “case” as “[a] cause or suit in court” and
says that the term “is nearly synonymous” with the term “cause.”313 The same
dictionary defines “cause” as a “suit or action in court.”314 Based on these
definitions, the Court of Appeals determined that the Founder’s understanding of
the term “case,” at least as it relates to the Fifth Amendment, included more than
the trial itself.315
Apart from the dictionary definitions, the Court of Appeals also supported its
decision by considering the Framer’s understanding of the phrase “in any criminal
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case.”316 First the court considered a draft of the Fifth Amendment by James
Madison which omitted the phrase “criminal case” and read:
No person shall be subject, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same
offense; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where
it may be necessary for public use, without just compensation.317

The court found this draft meant that the protection against self-incrimination
extended to civil as well as criminal cases.318
Second, the court addressed an objection to Madison’s wording of the Fifth
Amendment by Representative John Laurence, who was concerned that Madison’s
wording would create a conflict with “laws passed.”319 While it was unclear what
laws might be conflicted, Rep. Laurence proposed adding the phrase “in any
criminal case.”320 The court also argued that at the time that Rep. Laurence’s
addition was accepted there was agreement that “the right against selfincrimination was not limited to a suspects own trial.”321 The reason for this was
that, at the time of the ratification of the Fifth Amendment, criminal defendants
were unable to testify in their own cases.322
Finally, in determining that the right against self-incrimination applied to
more than just trial, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument that this
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was not practical because pretrial hearings
are frequently used to determine admissibility of evidence at trial.323 The basis for
this argument is that “courts have held . . . that evidence may be used in pretrial
hearings even if the evidence would be inadmissible at trial.”324 The Court of
Appeals did not find this argument helpful because it assumes that the use of
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compelled statements in pretrial hearings is not inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment.325 Since the court found that the Fifth Amendment did apply to
pretrial hearings, it necessarily followed that compelled statements are
inadmissible in pretrial proceedings.326
C. Analysis
From an evolutionary view, the right against self-incrimination is in a
fascinating position. The split between circuits highlights the attempt to maintain
a traditional view of the right, consistent with its history and prior applications,
while at the same time showing the beginnings of the law moving in a different
direction. This is doctrinal evolution in real time.
Eventually, one of these strains of thought will prevail and be explicitly adopted
by the United States Supreme Court. There is reason to believe that the evolving
view, which is to say the view that the right against self-incrimination extends to
pre-trial proceedings as well as applying at trial, will eventually be adopted. Since
the ratification of the Constitution, a number of changes have occurred in criminal
law, including the development of the modern police force, the development of rules
of evidence, and most importantly, the formalization of criminal procedure. The
old view of the right against self-incrimination does not account for these changes.
A proponent of maintaining the traditional view of the right against selfincrimination might argue that the text of the Fifth Amendment should be
interpreted through the meaning of the words at the time they were written. This
sort of Originalism, as Justice Scalia notes, “requires the consideration of an
enormous mass of materials.”327 Nonetheless, in Vogt, the Tenth Circuit undertook
just that sort of analysis. The Vogt Court attempted to determine the meaning of
“criminal case” by relying on dictionaries from the founding era.328 The court found
that the term “case” meant “a cause or suit in court.”329 This Originalist approach,
at least as applied by the Vogt court, is unconvincing for two reasons: first, the
definition of “case” relied upon by the Court does not lead directly to the conclusion
that the Framers intended the right against self-incrimination to extend beyond
trial. Second, there is a gap in this reasoning that would need to be filled by
addressing criminal procedure at the time of ratification.
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If we interpret the phrase “criminal case” to mean criminal cases as we
experience them today, it is difficult to exclude pre-trial proceedings from
protection. There is precedent to support this view. In Counselman v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that a witness could invoke the Fifth Amendment during a
grand jury proceeding because the Fifth Amendment’s “criminal case” language is
more broad than the Sixth Amendment “criminal prosecution” language.330
Counselman also seems to support the idea that the term “criminal case” should be
interpreted by considering the plain meaning of the text in modern language.331
A counter argument against extending the right against self-incrimination
might point out that evidence which is not admissible at trial is often admitted at
pre-trial proceedings. This argument was rejected by the Vogt court on the grounds
that it assumes the use of compelled statements at pre-trial proceedings is not
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.332 Additionally, the fact that some evidence
which is inadmissible at trial may be considered in pretrial proceedings does little
to address the fact that criminal procedure, and the scope of the “criminal case” has
changed since the Fifth Amendment was ratified. It is more reasonable to conclude
that the law regarding the scope of criminal cases has evolved, and that the law
regarding the scope of the right against self-incrimination should change with it.
CONCLUSION

By reviewing the history and application of the right against self-incrimination,
it is evident that this right has evolved over time from its early origins in the English
common law, through its enshrinement in the Fifth Amendment, and on to the
present. It is equally evident that this right is now at a point where it may either
evolve to address the “criminal case” in its modern form or keep plugging along in
its traditional form. While allowing the right to continue to evolve best suits the
needs of defendants in modern criminal cases, only time will tell whether the courts
will continue to allow the right against self-incrimination to grow, or force it to
remain a relic of late 18th Century criminal procedure.
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